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Abstract: Goetz outlined legal models of identical entities that include 
natural persons who are identical to a coregency and natural persons 
who are identical to a general partnership. Those entities cohere with 
the formula logic of relative identity. This essay outlines the coexistence 
of relative identity and numerical identity in the models of identical 
legal entities, which is an account of impure relative identity. These 
models support the synthesis of Relative Trinitarianism and Social 
Trinitarianism, which I call Relative-Social Trinitarianism. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Goetz (2014) outlined two categories of identical legal entities. The first category is 
an undivided natural person who is multiple public officials. The second category is 
multiple natural persons who are an undivided entity such as a general partnership 
or a customary coregency.1 This essay proposes that the second category is useful for 
Trinitarian theology. For example, Tertullian (c. 145–220) and Gregory of Nazianzus 
(c. 325–391) compared the unity of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit to the unity of a 
coregency. Also, models of identical legal entities help to synthesize Relative 
Trinitarianism (RT) and Social Trinitarianism (ST). I call this Relative-Social 
Trinitarianism (RST). 
 RT and ST are contemporary philosophical accounts of Trinitarianism. Basic 
descriptions for RT and ST follow. RT uses the logic of relative identity to explain the 
threeness-oneness paradox of the Trinity (Van Inwagen 2011); ST in various ways 
defend that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are three divine persons who enjoy 
interpersonal relationships with each other while they are one God (Hasker 2014). 
 RT also divides into two primary categories that are (1) pure RT and (2) 
impure RT. Additionally, this paper proposes a unique model of impure RT that 
includes Trinitarian analogy and merges that model with ST. 
                                                 
1 The descriptions of (1) a general partnership and (2) a customary coregency are strange because 
they are unlike most entities and cohere to the formula logic of relative identity outlined in section 3. 
For example, "x and y are the same F, but x and y are different Gs." Also, one might suppose that a 
general partnership or a customary coregency is a collective entity, but that is a misconception. 
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 In the rest of this essay, section 2 summarizes the definitions and metaphysics 
of legal entities; section 3 models the coexistence of numerical identity and relative 
identity in cases of legal entities; section 4 analyzes Leibniz's Law; section 5 
introduces identical entities and RST; section 6 analyzes RT; section 7 analyzes an 
objection to ST; section 8 concludes with a brief discussion of the Gospel of John and 
the fourth-century creeds. 
 
 
2. Legal entities and metaphysical entities  
 
This section defines respective legal terminology and the metaphysics of natural law 
entities. 
 
 
2.1 Contemporary definitions of legal entities and metaphysical entities 
 
Three primary types of contemporary legal entities are (1) a geopolitical entity, (2) a 
natural person, and (3) a juristic entity. Also, the term legal entity is synonymous with 
legal person. Additionally, in the context of natural law theory and metaphysics, each 
case of a legal entity is also a concrete entity. 
 First, a geopolitical entity is a geographical area with a political structure while 
the entity acts with autonomy. The typical contemporary geopolitical entity is a 
sovereign state defined by the international Convention on Rights and Duties of States 
(1933). For example, Article 1 says: "The state as a person of international law should 
possess the following qualifications: a ) a permanent population; b ) a defined 
territory; c ) government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states." 
Also, Article 4 says: "States are juridically equal, enjoy the same rights, and have equal 
capacity in their exercise. The rights of each one do not depend upon the power which 
it possesses to assure its exercise, but upon the simple fact of its existence as a person 
under international law." 
 Typical attributes of geopolitical entities include the following: 
 
1. A typical geopolitical entity has public departments. 
2. A department could be a geographical division or an administrative 
division. 
3. Legislation can make any department into a juristic entity. 
4. Any department can have its own departments. 
5. Each department has its distinct governmental authority. 
6. All departments have public officials. 
7. The officials are natural persons who are inseparable from their 
public office and likewise identical to their office. 
 
Second, a natural person is a freeborn human who possesses rights and duties. The 
primary right is the right to own property. Also, natural persons are inseparable from 
their property. Similarly, a natural person who owns an unincorporated 
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proprietorship is inseparable from the proprietorship and likewise identical to the 
proprietorship.  
 Third, a juristic entity is a public department or a private business other than 
an unincorporated proprietorship (Deiser 1908; 1909a; 1909b). A public juristic 
entity is made from legislation. A private juristic entity is made in accordance with 
legislation. All juristic entities possess rights and duties derived from legislation while 
the primary right is the right to own property. Also, synonymous terms for juristic 
entity include juristic person, juridical entity, juridical person, artificial entity, artificial 
person, fictitious entity, and fictitious person. 
 Fourth, legal fiction refers to judicial court assumptions apart from legislation. 
For example, legal fiction says that all judicial entities, general partnerships, and 
natural persons have equal standing as a claimant or defendant. However, the equal 
standing in court is limited outside of court and never granted any juristic entity or 
general partnership the right to vote in any public election. 
 Fifth, the definitions in the above first to fourth are standard for all schools of 
legal philosophy while this paragraph defines the terms abstract and concrete in the 
context of natural law theory. I simply intend a generic contrast for concrete and 
abstract. For example, the concept of a legal entity is an abstract entity while an 
individual legal entity is a concrete entity. For instance, the French Republic is a legal 
entity and a concrete entity. Also, a natural person is a legal entity and a concrete 
entity. Other examples of concrete entities include cases of (1) a territory, (2) a 
population of residents, (3) a government, (4) a public department, (5) a public 
official, and (6) property. Additionally, I use the term physical entity, which is a 
concrete entity that foremost derives its existence from the fundamental forces of 
physics. 
 
 
2.2 Outline of Key Historical Developments 
 
The first legal entities might have been Middle Paleolithic / Middle Stone Age 
tribunals that deliberated customary rules to settle disputes about movable property. 
For example, starting 100,000 years ago, highly sophisticated technologies began to 
sporadically emerge and disappear. This might have coincided with the first 
deliberations of customary tribunals to settle disputes about ownership and trade of 
food and technology. Eventually, highly sophisticated technologies began to 
perpetuate 50,000 years ago during the advent of the Upper Paleolithic / Later Stone 
Age.  This also included the ownership of clothing and movable shelter. Likewise, 
Upper Paleolithic developments of movable property had prompted the perpetuation 
of tribunals that settled disputes about ownership. 
 Geopolitical entities first emerged around 10,500 years ago after the invention 
of agriculture that prompted the Neolithic Era / New Stone Age. In a sense, the first 
geopolitical entity was the first farm with permanent residents and a defined 
territory. For example, every farm has some form of management, which is a form of 
government. Also, the first farm with permanent residents and defined territory was 
not a geopolitical division, so this was an autonomous government. However, when 
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neighboring farms developed and prompted the formation of a municipality, then the 
first farm became a mere proprietorship unless the proprietor was also the ruler of 
the municipality. Eventually, cities and then kingdoms emerged. The customary 
kingdoms included natural persons, public officials, proprietors, and geopolitical 
departments. 
 Around 2,000 BCE, contracts for loans began to emerge in the Ancient Near 
East. Ancient Rome codified the existence of juristic entities. Roman juristic persons 
included tribunals, provinces, cities, towns, religious bodies, associations of 
government officials, associations of commercial proprietors, social associations, and 
universities, but they did not include the Roman Empire.  
 Finally, the modern era codified the existence of coexisting sovereign states, 
intellectual property, private corporations, unincorporated limited liability 
corporations, and other types of private business entities. 
 
 
Section 2.3 Metaphysics of legal entities 
 
This subsection summarizes the metaphysics of geopolitical entities and respective 
parts. 
A geopolitical entity has a defined territory, a permanent population, and a 
government. The territory and population are tangible parts while the government is 
an intangible part.  This indicates that a geopolitical entity is a tangible-intangible 
dualistic entity. Also, all legal entities with tangible parts are a dualistic entity. 
 The intangible nature of government is extraordinarily plastic. For example, 
the primary government of a geopolitical entity and its departments are distinct while 
they nonetheless coincide with each other.  
 Contemporary consensus of legal scholars advances that natural law theory 
helps to explain the metaphysics of intangible government. A dissenting minority 
such as legal positivists reject the existence of natural law, which this paper calls 
natural law anti-realism. For example, natural law theorists accept the existence of 
natural rights while natural law anti-realists reject the existence of natural rights. For 
instance, natural law theory advances that a natural person's right to own property is 
natural while natural rights anti-realism advances that a natural person's right to own 
property is an artificial construction. Similarly, natural law theory advances that the 
origin of government and political officials was natural while a natural rights anti-
realist advances that all government and political officials are an artificial 
construction. Also, natural law theory advances that some juristic persons such a city 
are natural. 
 Goetz (2014) proposes a natural law theory for the unity of legal entities based 
on the self-organization of social animals and organic precursors of natural rights. The 
theory coheres with both deontology and consequentialism. 
 Regarding self-organization, measurable patterns of self-organization and 
collective behavior among social vertebrates include (1) schools of fish, (2) flocks of 
birds, (3) herds and flocks of ungulate mammals, (4) human crowds, and (5) basic 
leadership and followership among fish, birds, ungulates, primates, and human 
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crowds.  For example, self-organization is a process that involves numerous 
interactions among local-level components of a system that cause the emergence of a 
global-level pattern in space and time. These measurable patterns suggest the reality 
of organic social organization among various vertebrates that first emerged and 
perpetuated since the Paleozoic Era (542 to 252 million years ago). This organic social 
organization is also a major component of all geopolitical entities. 
 Also, Hermann Haken (2008) pioneered research that indicates self-
organization occurs in many fields of natural science, social science, and technology. 
Likewise, self-organization exists in every nook and cranny of the universe. 
 More phenomena comparable to the self-organization of social vertebrates 
include empirical evidence that indicates many primate populations develop complex 
social systems. Also, material evidence from the Neolithic Era / New Stone Age 
suggests that humans who develop farming technology possess an organic tendency 
to form the custom of a geopolitical entity. 
 Regarding natural rights, a basic natural right is the right to own movable 
property. An organic precursor to the ownership of movable property was animals 
that constructed and protected nests. The animals include species of insects, fish, 
amphibians, reptiles, birds, and mammals. This ubiquitous construction and 
protection of nests has resemblance to property ownership because the nests belong 
to the particular animals. In the cases of nest building birds and mammals, empirical 
evidence indicates that hormones regulate the nesting instinct. Also, the organic 
management of rudimentary stone tools in the Lower Paleolithic / Earlier Stone Age 
(2.6 million to 300 thousand years ago) by hominids had resemblance to movable 
property ownership because the stone tools belonged to the hominids. Additionally, 
the Lower Paleolithic management of stone tools was an organic precursor to the 
property ownership in the previously mentioned Upper Paleolithic. These organic 
phenomena suggest that property ownership is natural. Furthermore, the right to 
own property is an international custom. 
 The ubiquitous evidence of self-organization and organic precursors of 
property ownership suggests that geopolitical entities with all of their moral faults 
and virtues are foremost naturally organized. This natural organization also suggests 
that intangible governmental authority is a physical entity. For example, as previously 
defined, a physical entity is foremost derived from the fundamental forces of physics. 
Consider also the following summary of evidence that supports the physical existence 
of intangible authority: 
 
Despite the intangible nature of government, research of past and 
current phenomena indicates strong evidence that legal persons 
sometimes generate enormous force. Great nations rise and fall. 
Government officials declare war and armies fight with tangible 
weapons. Legal entities buy and sell property. Universities grant 
academic degrees. A cartoon character is intangible property that 
generates multibillions of US dollars per year. Banks and law 
enforcement foreclose mortgages of family residences. Governments 
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and economies around the world operate according to the logic of law. 
(Goetz 2014) 
 
This natural law theory supports that intangible government and concomitant 
intangible authority generate enormous physical force. This also indicates the 
extraordinary plasticity of intangible authority. For example, legislation enables a 
private corporation to make an abstract concept of a cartoon character into 
intellectual property that generates multibillions of US dollars per years. 
 
 
Section 2.4 Special cases of general partnerships and coregencies 
 
In the context of natural law theory, this paper and subsection focus on the puzzling 
metaphysics of general partnerships and coregencies. For example, a general 
partnership is multiple natural persons who are the same legal entity. Also, a 
coregency is multiple joint monarchs who are the same monarchical office. For the 
rest of this paper, a customary coregency is simply called a coregency. 
 A general partnership is a type of unincorporated proprietorship. For example, 
sole proprietorships and general partnerships are ancient customs. A sole 
proprietorship is naturally inseparable from the sole proprietor who is the respective 
natural person. The proprietor has all authority and all liability of the business, which 
indicates that the proprietor is identical to the proprietorship. Comparatively, a 
general partnership has multiple proprietors called general partners who each have 
all authority and all liability of the business, which indicates that each general partner 
is identical to the partnership. 
 Various interlocutors have confused general partnerships with the legislative 
fiction of private corporations and limited liability companies. However, general 
partnerships as well as sole proprietorships are formed without legislation and have 
no limits on liability while private corporations and limited liability companies are 
formed in accordance with legislation that makes fictitious separation between the 
owners and their businesses. This fictitious separation is appealing because it limits 
liability. Likewise, there is a major difference between a general partnership and a 
limited liability partnership. Also, the fictitious separation is an ongoing controversy 
in the news while lawyers and judges never question if a private corporation or a 
limited liability company is a legal person. 
 In the case of judicial court, legal fiction grants equal standing as a claimant or 
defendant to any natural person, general partnership, or juristic entity. Also, the court 
never entertains any differences of opinion about the realism or anti-realism of legal 
entities.2 
 Cases of coregency compare to general partnerships because a coregency is 
multiple natural persons who each are the same entity and the same authority. A 
monarch or coregency is not technically a legal entity, but each case is a physical entity. 
                                                 
2 For example, a shrewd lawyer who is a natural law anti-realist, mereological nihilist, or global 
skeptic might dazzle the courts with brilliant arguments while feigning belief in the reality of all laws. 
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Also, an absolute monarch or absolute coregency might not be defined as a public 
office but is nonetheless office-like. 
Notable ancient examples of coregencies include the following: 
 
1. Some Egyptian Pharaohs appointed their successor to joint ruler in a 
senior-junior relationship with identical authority (Dodson 2014). 
2. Some Egyptian Pharaohs appointed their wife to joint ruler with 
identical authority (Dodson 2014). 
3. King David near the end of his life appointed Solomon to joint 
monarch (1 Chronicles 29). 
4. The Roman Senate in 44 BCE appointed the triumvirate of Octavian, 
Marcus Lepidus, and Mark Antony while each of the triumvirs enjoyed 
absolute authority that was restrained only by a term limit. 
5. The Roman Senate in 13 CE appointed Octavian and Tiberius to 
identical office. 
 
Consider the case of the 44–33 BCE monarchical-like triumvirate of Octavian, Lepidus, 
and Antony. Each triumvir enjoyed the same absolute authority that was restrained 
only by a term limit. Octavian was identical to the triumvirate; Lepidus was identical 
to the triumvirate; Antony was identical to the triumvirate; Octavian, Lepidus, and 
Antony were different natural persons. 
 
 
3. The coexistence of numerical identity and relative 
identity 
 
The majority of analytic philosophers hold to classical logic while supporting that 
everything in the universe coheres with the concept of numerical identity (NI) that is 
defined by Leibniz's Law (LL). Alternatively, Geach (1967; 1969; 1977) rejected the 
existence of NI while proposing relative identity (RI). Additionally, Gupta (1980) 
proposed an in-between view that accepts some cases of NI and some cases of RI. The 
rest of this section looks at the coexistence of NI and RI in mathematical equality and 
legal models of identical entities. 
 The term NI is also synonymous with the term absolute identity. Additionally, 
NI is typically defined by Leibniz's Law (LL) that states the following: 
 
(LL) x is identical to y indicates that for every property F, entity x has F 
if and only if entity y has F. 
 
In other words, LL states that no two distinct things possess the same properties and 
no other properties. 
 Alternatively, the formula logic of RI states the following: 
 
(RI) x and y are the same F, but x and y are different Gs. 
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The formula indicates that x is identical to F; y is identical to F; x and y are different 
entities. A notable characteristic of RI is the existence of identicalness without 
absolute identicalness and similar biconditionality. For example, RI indicates the 
following: x is identical to F, but not x if and only if F; y is identical to F, but not y if and 
only if F; x is not identical to y. One might suspect that transitivity would indicate that 
x is identical y, but that is not the case with RI. 
 The coexistence of NI and RI indicates that the terms identical and same need 
contextual clarification. For example, two things that are identical could be 
numerically identical or relatively identical. Or two things that are the same could be 
numerically same or relatively same. 
 Abstract examples of relative identity include applications of mathematical 
equality. For example, Presocratic philosophers defined mathematical equality. Also, 
Quine's (1960, chapter 7) mathematical realism indicates that expressions, variables, 
numbers, and values are abstract entities. For instance, consider A = B. This equation 
indicates that the variables A and B possess numerically identical value while the 
variables are different entities. In the case of the RI formula, 
 
x = A; y = B; F = value; Gs = variables.  
 
The formula indicates the following: 
 
1. A is relatively identical to the value, but not A if and only if the value. 
2. B is relatively identical to the value, but not B if and only if the value. 
3. The value of A if and only if the value of B. 
4. A is not identical to B. 
 
Consider also the following expressions 1 + 3 and 2 + 2. The expressions possess 
numerically identical value that is 4 while the expressions are different entities. In the 
case of the RI formula, 
 
x = 1 + 3; y = 2 + 2; F = value; Gs = expressions. 
 
The formula indicates the following: 
 
1. The expression 1 + 3 is relatively identical to the value 4, but not 1 + 
3 if and only if 4. 
2. The expression 2 + 2 is relatively identical to the value 4, but not 2 + 
2 if and only if 4. 
3. The value of 1 + 3 if and only if the value of 2 + 2. 
4. The expression 1 + 3 is not identical to the expression 2 + 2. 
 
Identical legal entities also cohere with the formula logic of RI (Goetz 2014, 45–46). 
Consider the following cases from section 2: (1) a natural person who is a public 
official, (2) a general partnership, and (3) a coregency. 
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 First case, natural person Lepidus became the triumvir and the pontifex 
maximus. Lepidus was the triumvir while Lepidus was the pontifex maximus. 
However, the triumvir and the pontifex maximus were different entities. In the case of 
the RI formula, 
 
x = the triumvir; y = the pontifex maximus; 
F = natural person; Gs = public entities. 
 
The formula indicates the following: 
 
1. The triumvir was relatively identical to Lepidus, but not the triumvir 
if and only if Lepidus. 
2. The pontifex maximus was relatively identical to Lepidus, but not the 
pontifex maximus if and only if Lepidus. 
3. Lepidus who existed as the triumvir if and only if Lepidus who existed 
as the pontifex maximus. 
4. The triumvir was not identical to the pontifex maximus. 
 
Second case, natural persons X and Y become proprietors while forming general 
partnership C. X is C and possesses the entire authority of C; Y is C and possesses the 
entire authority of C; X and Y are different natural persons. In the case of the RI 
formula, 
 
x = X; y = Y; F = general partnership C; Gs = natural persons. 
 
The formula indicates the following: 
 
1. X is relatively identical to C, but not X if and only if C. 
2. Y is relatively identical to C, but not Y if and only if C. 
3. X's authority of C if and only if Y's authority of C. 
4. X is not identical to Y. 
 
Third case, Octavian, Lepidus, and Antony were natural persons who became 
triumvirs of the second triumvirate. Octavian was the triumvirate and possessed 
absolute authority; Lepidus was the triumvirate and possessed absolute authority; 
Antony was the triumvirate and possessed absolute authority; Octavian, Lepidus, and 
Antony were different natural persons. In the case of the RI formula, 
 
x = Octavian; y = Lepidus; z = Antony; 
F = the second triumvirate; Gs = natural persons. 
 
The formula indicates the following: 
 
1. Octavian was relatively identical to the triumvirate, but not Octavian 
if and only if the triumvirate. 
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2. Lepidus was relatively identical to the triumvirate, but not Lepidus if 
and only if the triumvirate. 
3. Antony was relatively identical to the triumvirate, but not Antony if 
and only if the triumvirate. 
4. Octavian's absolute authority if and only if Lepidus's absolute 
authority. 
5. Octavian's absolute authority if and only if Antony's absolute 
authority. 
6. Lepidus's absolute authority if and only if Antony's absolute 
authority. 
7. Octavian was not identical to Lepidus. 
8. Octavian was not identical to Antony. 
9. Lepidus was not identical to Antony. 
 
The if and only if statements in the RI cases indicate the coexistence of relative 
identicalness and numerical identicalness, which indicates the coexistence of RI and 
NI. This coexistence indicates impure RI and impure NI, which are synonymous terms. 
Alternatively, Geach's RI that rejects all reality of NI is pure RI while classical logic 
supports pure NI. Additionally, I propose a straightforward law of temporal identity 
that states the following: 
 
Anything is absolutely identical to itself and nothing else at any given 
point of time. 
 
Impure RI and impure NI also contain multiplication and addition. For example, each 
of the Gs is equivalent to the number 1. In the case for the number of F, the expression 
with each of the Gs uses multiplication. In the case for the number of Gs, the 
expression with each of the Gs uses addition. Consider the triumvirate and triumvirs: 
 
The number of triumvirates = 1 x 1 x 1. 
The number of triumvirs = 1 + 1 + 1. 
 
 
4. Analysis of LL 
 
Per the previously stated law of temporal identity, NI indicates that an entity is 
absolutely identical to itself at any given point of time. However, classical logicians 
typically reject that LL and NI always mean that an entity is absolutely the same to 
itself in the case of change. Consider LL that was previously stated: 
 
(LL) x is identical to y indicates that for every property F, entity x has F 
if and only if entity y has F. 
 
LL indicates that F is a set of properties that is contained in x and contained in y, but 
classical expressions of NI over time indicate that F is something other than the set of 
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all properties for the same tangible entity at two distinguishable points of time. For 
instance, the field of physics indicates that a Planck time is the smallest possible unit 
of measurement for time in a physical universe while all elementary particles change 
their position from one Planck time to the next, so every tangible entity changes its 
composition from any given Planck time to the next. Also, absolute sameness breaks 
down from change, which is a propositional tautology. Consider also the following 
case of human N over time. 
 Human N possesses different properties for any given point of time to the next 
distinguishable point of time. Consider N represented in a four-dimensional 
spacetime coordinate system. Each point in a spacetime coordinate system is assigned 
three spatial dimensions and one time dimension. N at point of time 0 (NT0) and N at 
point of time 1 (NT1) are not identical compositions when the difference in time 
between NT0 and NT1 is at least 1 Planck time because N at bare minimum has a 
change in the position of all elementary particles. Likewise, NT0 ≠ NT1 in the context 
of composition while NT0 = NT1 in the context of identity. Absolute sameness 
indisputably breaks down during the passage of time from NT0 to NT1 because NT0 
and NT1 possess a different set of properties. Nonetheless, the identity of any legal 
entity such as a natural person endures all nonessential changes to the entity. In this 
case of N, no classical logician would suggest that NT0 if and only if NT1. 
 Consider the two most popular replies by analytic philosophers to the puzzle 
of identity over time and change (Deutsch 2012). In the case of NT0 and NT1, the two 
most popular replies would follow: reply 1, simple properties that are different 
between NT0 and NT1 are actually relations to times and have nothing to do with 
identity; reply 2, the differences between NT0 and NT1 are distinct temporal parts or 
stages of the whole temporally extended N and have nothing to do with identity. These 
replies in one way or another indicate that F in LL is a subset of properties for NT0 
and NT1. Also, replies 1 and 2 cohere with the formula logic of RI. Per reply 1, NT0 is 
x; NT1 is y; N is F; different relations of times for N are Gs: NT0 and NT1 are the same 
N while NT0 and NT1 are different relations of times for N. Per reply 2, NT0 is x; NT1 is 
y; N is F; different temporal parts or stages for N are Gs: NT0 and NT1 are the same N 
while NT0 and NT1 are different temporal parts or stages of N. 
 The classical replies are creative while expressing LL despite change over time. 
But classical logic faces problems with cases of identical entities. For example, section 
2 indicates the following five facts regarding the second triumvirate: 
 
F1. There was one second triumvirate. 
F2. Octavian was identical to the triumvirate and possessed absolute 
authority. 
F3. Lepidus was identical to the triumvirate and possessed absolute 
authority. 
F4. Antony was identical to the triumvirate and possessed absolute 
authority. 
F5. Octavian, Lepidus, and Antony were different natural persons. 
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I doubt that any creative expression of LL could cohere with F1–F5. For example, LL 
could cohere with F1–F4 while rejecting F5 and state that Octavian, Lepidus, and 
Antony were not different natural persons. Or LL could reject F1 while cohering with 
F2–F5 and state that there were three second triumvirates. But LL evidently lacks the 
flexibility to cohere with F1–F5. Additionally, rejecting F1 or F5 is historically false 
because F1–F5 is historically true. Alternatively, RI in section 3 coheres with F1–F5. 
 
 
5. Legal models of identical entities and the Trinity 
 
Legal models of identical entities can analogize the medieval Shield of the Trinity that 
summarizes the threeness-oneness paradox in the Athanasian Creed. For example, the 
Shield of the Trinity makes that following six propositions: 
 
1. The Father is God and vice versa. 
2. The Son is God and vice versa. 
3. The Holy Spirit is God and vice versa. 
4. The Father is not the Son and vice versa. 
5. The Father is not the Holy Spirit and vice versa. 
6. The Son is not the Holy Spirit and vice versa. 
 
Analogizing the Athanasian definition of the Trinity to a general partnership indicates 
that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are general partners while the triune God is the 
general partnership. Also, analogizing the Trinity to a coregency indicates that the 
Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are joint monarchs while the triune God is the coregency. 
In both analogies, the Father is the triune God; the Son is the triune God; the Holy 
Spirit is to the triune God; the Father and Son are different unipersonalities; the Father 
and Holy Spirit are different unipersonalities; the Son and Holy Spirit are different 
unipersonalities. This indicates that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are three 
unipersonalities who are one triune God. 
 Remarkable properties of the general partnership and coregency analogies 
include that the analogies cohere with Relative Trinitarianism (RT) and Social 
Trinitarianism (ST) while the synthesis of RT and ST is Relative-Social Trinitarianism 
(RST). For example, the Trinitarian analogies cohere with ST because multiple 
persons of an identical entity can enjoy interpersonal relationships with each other. 
Also, the Trinitarian analogies cohere with RT because they cohere with the RI 
formula. 
 In the case of the RI formula and the Trinitarian analogies, 
 
x = the Father; y = the Son; z = the Holy Spirit; 
F = the triune God; Gs = unipersonalities. 
 
The formula indicates that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are the same triune God 
while the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are different divine unipersonalities. 
Additionally, 
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1. The Father is relatively identical to the triune God, but not the Father 
if and only if the triune God. 
2. The Son is relatively identical to the triune God, but not the Son if and 
only if the triune God. 
3. The Holy Spirit is relatively identical to the triune God, but not the 
Holy Spirit if and only if the triune God. 
4. The Father's divine authority if and only if the Son's divine authority. 
5. The Father's divine authority if and only if the Holy Spirit's divine 
authority. 
6. The Son's divine authority if and only if the Holy Spirit's divine 
authority. 
7. The Father is not identical to the Son. 
8. The Father is not identical to the Holy Spirit. 
9. The Son is not identical to the Holy Spirit. 
 
One might challenge that the general partnership and coregency analogies of the 
Trinity support tritheism instead of monotheism. However, in the case of a general 
partnership, regardless of the number of general partners who individually enjoy the 
entire authority of the general partnership, there is always one concrete general 
partnership. Or regardless of the number of joint monarchs who individually enjoy 
the entire authority of any coregency, there is always one concrete coregency. 
Likewise, in the case of God, each of the three divine persons and any combination of 
them are always one God who is one authority. 
 Any analogy of God, however, needs qualifications. For example, the term 
analogy indicates similarities and dissimilarities. 
 Biblical authors routinely analogized God to the legal concepts of king and 
judge. However, God is dissimilar to a king or judge. For example, all natural persons 
who become a king or judge had a beginning while God exists with no beginning. 
Moreover, some biblical analogies are astonishingly dissimilar to God. For instances, 
Isaiah 31:5 compares God to a flock of birds and Luke 18:1–8 compares God to an 
unrighteous judge. 
 In any case, philosophy and theology requires careful qualification for all 
analogies of God. Consider the following two sets of dissimilarities between the 
Trinity and identical legal entities. 
First, the dissimilarities of the Trinity compared to identical legal entities 
include: 
 
1. The Trinity exists without beginning or end. 
2. The Trinity is divine substance. 
3. The Trinity is inexhaustible love and incorruptibility. 
4. The Trinity is inexhaustible perception. 
5. The Father, Son, and Holy Spirit possess equal levels of ability.  
6. The Father, Son, and Holy Spirit always see and act with unity. 
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Second, the dissimilarities of identical legal entities compared to the Trinity include: 
 
1. General partnerships and coregencies emerge from previously 
separate natural persons and potentially terminate. 
2. General partnerships and coregencies are made of legal authority. 
3. General partnerships and coregencies possess human love and 
corruptibility. 
4. General partnerships and coregencies possess limited perception. 
5. General partners or joint monarchs might possess unequal levels of 
ability. 
6. General partners or joint monarchs might see and act with disunity. 
 
 
6. Relative Trinitarianism 
 
Rea (2011a) categorizes RT into pure RT and impure RT. Pure RT assumes pure RI and 
impure RT assumes impure RI. Geach (1967; 1969) originally proposed pure RI, and 
Geach (1977, 72–81) outlined pure RT. Other proponents of pure RT include 
Martinich (1978; 1979) and Cain (1989). Alternatively, van Inwagen (2011) and this 
essay propose impure RT. 
 Rea (2011a) objects to all versions of pure RT because they indicate anti-
realism of NI. Rea also objects to van Inwagen's RT because van Inwagen supposedly 
never makes a clear acceptance for the reality of NI. However, he explicitly rejects all 
nontheological models of RI, which at first glance suggests that he accepts the reality 
of NI. Also, van Inwagen (1993) defends classical logic in the case of the material 
world. In any case, section 3 of this essay models the coexistence of NI and RI, which 
helps to resolve Rea's objection to RT. 
 I appreciate Martinich's (1979) model of pure RT that incorporates Tertullian's 
analogy of coregency. However, I disagree with the pure RT. Also, another nuance 
between our models is that Martinich never uses the term coregency while he says 
that two simultaneous emperors are the same emperor. 
 Rea (2011a) also insists that impure RT must tell a non-heretical story: 
 
Thus, for example, telling a story according to which Father, Son, and 
Holy Spirit can be the same God but different Persons in just the same 
way that two cars can be the same color but different cars clearly will 
not do the job. 
 
Consider the story of a red Porsche and a red Jaguar. This coheres with the RI formula 
logic while x is the red Porsche; y is the red Jaguar; F is the color red. In this case, the 
color red is an abstract entity. Likewise, stating that the Porsche is relatively identical 
to the color red while the Jaguar is relatively identical to the color red does not satisfy 
Rea's intuitions about the metaphysics of the Trinity. Perhaps Rea objects because 
theism assumes that God is a concrete entity who is not comparable to an abstract 
entity such as the color red. Also, mathematical modeling of equations in section 3 
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involves abstract entities. Nonetheless, the general partnership and coregency 
analogies refer to concrete examples of general partnership and concrete examples of 
coregency. For example, the concept of a coregency is an abstract entity while the 
triumvirate of Octavian, Lepidus, and Antony was a concrete coregency. 
 
 
7. An Objection to Social Trinitarianism 
 
As previously stated, various models of ST defend that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit 
are three divine persons who enjoy interpersonal relationships with each other while 
they are one God. At face value, these interpersonal relationships are consistent with 
the Son praying to the Father per the Gospels (for examples, Matthew 26:39; Mark 
14:16; Luke 22:41–42; John 17). However, critics of ST object to the prevalent ST view 
that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit share one general divine nature instead of one 
concrete divine nature (Rea 2011b). 
 Despite the prevalent ST view of general divine nature, Hasker (2014) 
proposes ST and one concrete divine nature. I agree with the objection to a general 
divine nature while that prevalent ST view is unnecessary for RST. Also, the identical 
entities analogies for the Trinity include one concrete authority, which plausibly 
corresponds to the divine substance. 
 Additionally, van Inwagen in personal communication to Hasker (2014, 
chapter 15) mentioned belief in interpersonal relationships between the three divine 
persons. This indicates that his impure RT is compatible with ST and likewise RST.  
 
 
8. Discussion on the Gospel of John and fourth-century 
creeds 
 
The Oxford Bible Commentary (accessed 24-Dec-2014) says that the prologue for the 
Gospel of John, which is John 1:1–18, explicitly states that Jesus is "identical" to the 
"Word" referenced in John 1:1–4. For example, 
 
In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the 
Word was God. He was in the beginning with God. All things came into 
being through him, and without him not one thing came into being. 
What has come into being in him was life, and the life was the light of 
all people. (John 1:1–4, New Revised Standard Version) 
.... 
And the Word became flesh and lived among us, and we have seen his 
glory, the glory as of a father’s only son, full of grace and truth. (John 
testified to him and cried out, "This was he of whom I said, 'He who 
comes after me ranks ahead of me because he was before me.'") From 
his fullness we have all received, grace upon grace. The law indeed was 
given through Moses; grace and truth came through Jesus Christ. No 
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one has ever seen God. It is God the only Son, who is close to the Father's 
heart, who has made him known. (John 1:14–18, NRSV) 
 
This prologue sets the stage for the entire Gospel of John. For examples, John assumes 
monotheism; John 1:1–18 says that Jesus is the Word who in the beginning was with 
God and generated all creation; John 14:16–17 says that the Holy Spirit is another 
Advocate who is comparable to Jesus; John 17 records Jesus praying to the Father in 
the context of an I-you interpersonal relationship, which means that Jesus refers to 
himself as "I" and to the Father as "you." 
These Johannine concepts plausibly indicate the following points: 
 
J1. There is one God. 
J2. The Father is God. 
J3. The Son is equal to God. 
J4. The Holy Spirit is equal to God. 
J5. The Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are different persons who enjoy 
interpersonal relationships with each other. 
 
The collection of these Johannine concepts is consistent with the fourth-century 
creeds, the Shield of the Trinity, and RST. Alternatively, the collection of these concepts 
is inconsistent with classical identity that is defined by LL. But the creeds, Shield of the 
Trinity, RST, and LL were undefined during the first-to-second-century authorship of 
John. However, during that time, inhabitants of the Roman Empire were familiar with 
general partnerships and coregencies. Also, educated inhabitants of the Roman 
Empire were familiar with mathematical expressions and values, Aristotelian law of 
identity, and the debate about identity over time for tangible objects that change such 
as Theseus's Ship (Goetz 2014). 
 Tertullian in the early third century tied together these Johannine concepts 
with his threeness-oneness model of monotheism when he developed an outstanding 
analogy between coregency and God. He made this analogy while opposing modalism 
advocated by Praxeas and Sabellius. For example, Tertullian (1885) said: 
 
I am sure that Monarchy has no other meaning than single and 
individual rule; but for all that, this monarchy does not, because it is the 
government of one, preclude him whose government it is, either from 
having a son, or from having made himself actually a son to himself, or 
from ministering his own monarchy by whatever agents he will. Nay 
more, I contend that no dominion so belongs to one only, as his own, or 
is in such a sense singular, or is in such a sense a monarchy, as not also 
to be administered through other persons most closely connected with 
it, and whom it has itself provided as officials to itself. If, moreover, 
there be a son belonging to him whose monarchy it is, it does not 
forthwith become divided and cease to be a monarchy, if the son also be 
taken as a sharer in it; but it is as to its origin equally his, by whom it is 
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communicated to the son; and being his, it is quite as much a monarchy 
(or sole empire), since it is held together by two who are so inseparable.  
 
Martinich (1979) said that Tertullian referred to the 161–169 Roman coregency of 
Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Versus. Also, Tertullian might have known about earlier 
examples listed in section 2 of this paper. 
 Gregory of Nazianzus's (1885) oration "On the Son" also made a comparison 
between coregency and God. Gregory is a prominent fourth-century church father and 
was a champion of Trinitarian theology, but his coregency analogy was brief and there 
is no other surviving record of a coregency analogy from any other fourth-century 
church father. For example, the Council of Nicea (325) and the Council of 
Constantinople (381) made no use of this analogy while the councils outlined the 
threeness-oneness of God while focusing on the eternal generation of the Son and the 
eternal procession of the Holy Spirit, which implies that the generation and 
procession exists beyond time and likewise without beginning or end. In any case, the 
coregency and general partnership analogies are compatible with the respective 
creeds.3 
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